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MEDICAL EVIDENCE IN WISCONSIN
1956-1966
SUEL 0. ARNOLD*
Ten years ago it was suggested by Judge Andrew Parnell that an
article be prepared which would serve as a ready reference for the
judge sitting on the bench and the trial attorney when confronted with
a problem relating to medical evidence. The favorable reception ac-
corded to that article, which appeared in 39 Marquette Law Review
289 (Spring, 1956), has been most gratifying.
Many developments have transpired during the past ten years in
the field of medical evidence. These events have prompted the writing
of this article which also has been prepared to serve as a ready refer-
ence for the judge and the trial attorney. The format adopted in 1956
shall again be followed. This article therefore will in effect serve as a
supplement to the 1956 article and cover the period from 1956 to 1966.
It is hoped that this article will receive the same favorable reception
as did its predecessor.
WHO MAY TESTIFY As A MEDICAL EXPERT
An objection is frequently urged that questions put to experts and
their answers invade the province of the jury. In Jacobson v. Grey-
hound Corporation,' the Greyhound Corporation called two county
highway commissioners to give expert testimony regarding the proper
manner of plowing snow and whether the driver of the county snow
plow operated the vehicle at an excessive rate of speed. Greyhound
sought to introduce the opinion testimony of the two expert witnesses
in the form of answers to hypothetical questions. The trial court re-
jected the testimony on the ground that it was not a proper subject for
expert testimony and that such testimony would invade the province
of the jury. The supreme court held that upon the assumption the two
witnesses were qualified as experts, an objection upon the sole ground
that their opinion would invade the province of the jury should not be
sustained.
The court in the Jacobson case commented that the court had dealt
* Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin 1924-30; Partner of firm of Arnold,
Murray and O'Neill; Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers; Member
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin Bar Associations.
'29 Wis. 2d 55, 138 N.W. 2d 133 (1965).
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with the same problem in Chapnitsky v. McClone.2 In that case, the
court said:
Defendant's counsel objected to both questions on the ground
that they invaded the province of the jury. The trial court
sustained the objections to both questions. Plaintiff contends
this ruling constituted prejudicial error. The questions were not
objectionable on that ground.3
In Jacobson, the court stated that a similar issue was recently before
the Supreme Court in Fehrmen v. Smirl.4 In that case, the court said:
It is urged that these questions and answers were incom-
petent because they invaded the province of the jury. This court,
however, is committed to the principle that expert opinion testi-
mony is not objectionable merely because it covers one of the
ultimate facts to be determined by the jury.5
In support of this holding the court cited a number of earlier Wis-
consin cases and 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, (3d ed. 1940) pages 18-20,
section 1921.
In Kreyer v. Farmers' Cooperative Lumber Co.,6 also cited in Jacob-
son, the court stated: "Trial courts have wide discretion as to admitting
opinion evidence of expert witnesses." '7
In Henthorn v. M.G.C. Coop.," counsel objected to questions ad-
dressed to an expert witness upon the ground that they invaded the
province of the jury. The supreme court held, contrary to the ruling
of the trial court, that this was a field in which trial courts are per-
mitted to exercise fairly wide discretion and that the court did not
consider it would be in error to permit a qualified expert to state his
opinion relating to the position of two motor vehicle units at the time
of impact, based upon such facts as damage to vehicles, position of the
units after the accident, marks or absence of marks on the pavement
and shoulders.
The decisions cited cover a range of subjects. In Clapnitsky v.
McClone,9 the expert witnesses were doctors. In Kreyer,10 the expert
was an electrician. In Henthorn,n the expert was a graduate civil
engineer.
The principle which controls whether or not expert opinion evi-
dence should be received is stated in Anderson v. Eggert,2 as follows:
220 Wis. 2d 453, 122 N.W. 2d 400 (1963).
" Id. at 462, 122 N.W. 2d at 405.
420 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W. 2d 255 (1963).
5Id. at 18, 121 N.W. 2d at 264.
6 18 Wis. 2d 67, 117 N.W. 2d 646 (1962).
7Id. at 75, 117 N.W. 2d at 650.
s 1 Wis. 2d 180, 83 N.W. 2d 759 (1957).
9 Supra note 2.10 Supra note 6.
11 Supra note 8.
12234 Wis. 348, 291 N.W. 365 (1940).
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Whether the testimony was properly received in this case
depends upon whether members of the jury having that knowl-
edge and general experience common to every member of the
community would be aided in a consideration of the issues by
the testimony offered and received.13
The test adopted in MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, pages 28-29, section 13,
is thus stated:
First, the subject of the inference must be so distinctly re-
lated to some science, profession, business or occupation as
to be beyond the ken of the average layman, and second, the
witness must have such skill, knowledge or experience in that
field of calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference
will probably aid the trier in his search for truth.
One requirement with respect to expert testimony must be rigidly
observed; an expert may give an opinion on an issue of ultimate fact,
but only on a hypothetical question.
The wide discretion of the trial court, in permitting the introduction
of expert testimony, is well-illustrated in three recent decisions. In
McDonald v. Bituminous Casualty Corp.'4 the court upheld the admis-
sion of testimony of a man who was skilled in felling trees. His testi-
mony was to the effect that where a tree is notched in preparation for
felling it with a saw, the tree is likely to fall in the direction the notch
points. Undoubtedly many of the jurors were familiar with this phe-
nomenon, but the supreme court had no difficulty in sustaining the
trial court's decision.
In Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co.,'1 the plaintiff attempted
to introduce in evidence expert testimony of a man who held the de-
grees of Master and Doctor of Science in Engineering. The trial court
refused to permit the introduction of expert testimony relating to
alleged defects in automobile tires. This refusal of the trial court was
bottomed upon the expert witness's lack of experience with automobile
tires. The supreme court sustained the decision of the trial court upon
the ground that there was no abuse of discretion. At the same time,
the supreme court emphasized that practical experience was not always
essential in the qualification of an expert witness.
Another illustration of permissible exercise of discretion by the
trial court is found in Frion v. Coren."6 In that case the court rejected
the testimony of architects that a railing from which the plaintiff fell
was not safe. The supreme court held, upon the authority of Hen-
thorn"* that the trial court was permitted great latitude in determining
whether expert opinion testimony should be received. The offer of
13 Id. at 361, 291 N.W. at 370.14 11 Wis. 2d 202, 105 N.W. 2d 312 (1960).




proof which was quoted in the supreme court opinion clearly justified
the action of the trial court in rejecting the testimony.
Two recent cases, not cited in Jacobson,'s follow Anderson v.
Eggert.9 These are State v. Schmear,20 involving the testimony of a
crime-lab technician who testified as to stains on certain items of
clothing worn by the defendant and on the clothing worn by the
complaining witness in an assault and battery case; and Schmidt v.
Chapman,2 . involving the expert testimony of a building inspector for
the City of Milwaukee, a supervisor in the office of the building in-
spector and a university graduate with course work in the composition
of soils.
In the light of the specialties in the field of medicine, Riehl v.
De Quaine=2 presented a question which probably will arise with in-
creasing frequency in the future. In this personal injury action Dr.
Caffrey testified that the plaintiff's condition was: "psycho-neurotic
anxiety reaction with a traumatic neurosis, compensation neurosis, in
a narcissistic immature individual . . .,,-3 The prognosis of the doctor
was that the plaintiff was a poor candidate for psychotherapy as long
as her case was pending. The doctor's conclusion was that the plain-
tiff's psychoneurotic depression has incapacitated her from work, was
permanent, and was causally connected with the accident.
Dr. Quade, who was a specialist in neurological surgery, examined
the plaintiff for the defendants and testified as a medical expert. His
diagnosis was a central nervous system objectively normal, subjective
nervousness and psychoneurosis. It was this doctor's opinion that the
psychoneurosis was not traumatic in nature. Dr. Quade's opinion was
that the plaintiff attributed all of her condition to the accident because
she was searching for a reason to justify the existence of such a
condition, i.e., "to find a scapegoat." It was apparent from the award
of damages by the jury that it concluded that neurosis was not caused
by the accident.
The court, in holding that there was no gradation of experts based
on specialized training or practice, said:
Counsel for plaintiffs argue that Dr. Caffrey's expert testi-
mony as a psychiatrist should carry more weight than Dr.
Quade's expert testimony as a neurosurgeon. The law, however,
does not recognize any gradation of experts based on special-
ized training or practice. So long as a physician qualifies as an
expert the weight to be accorded his testimony is for the jury.24
Is Supra note 1.
19 Supra note 12.
2028 Wis. 2d 126, 135 N.W. 2d 842 (1965).
2126 Wis. 2d 11, 131 N.W. 2d 689 (1964).
22 24 Wis. 2d 23, 127 N.W. 2d 788 (1964).
23 Id. at 31, 127 N.W. 2d at 792.
24 24 Wis. 2d at 32, 127 N.W. 2d at 793.
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It is suggested that the time has come when we should begin to
consider the qualification of an expert in a particular medical field
to testify as a medical specialist. The question of the competency of
a psychologist to testify as a medical expert was presented in Casimere
v. Herman.2 5 In that case Delores Casimere brought a personal injury
action against Herman and his insurer for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident in Milwaukee in March of 1962. The jury found
the wife of the defendant and driver of the automobile ninety (90%)_
per cent causally negligent and the plaintiff ten (10%) per cent caus-
ally negligent. The jury awarded the plaintiff a total of $9,650.00. The
dispute giving rise to the appeal related to the portions of the award
amounting to $2,500, for loss of earnings, and $4,500, for future pain
and suffering.
The plaintiff was treated by her personal physician, Dr. Henry L.
Dale, a general practitioner, and Dr. James Groh, an orthopedic sur-
geon. She also consulted Dr. Baker, who was the head of a psychiatric
clinic and Dr. Walter McDonald, a clinical psychologist and a member
of Dr. Baker's clinic. Drs. Dale, Groh and McDonald testified, but
Dr. Baker was not called, although he was available.
The defendant argued that Dr. McDonald, who was a psychologist
and not a doctor of medicine, was not competent to testify in support
of an award for future pain and suffering. The defendant insisted that
the question of future pain and suffering was a medical one and that
only a witness holding a medical degree and license under the Laws
of the State of Wisconsin was competent to testify. Reliance was had
upon the language used in Diemel v. Weirich.2 r In that case the court
held that only a medical expert was qualified to express an opinion to
a reasonable medical certainty or reasonable medical probability
whether pain would continue in the future and, if so, for how long.
In the absence of such expert testimony, no damages could be allowed
for future pain and suffering.
The plaintiff distinguished Diemel v. Weirich and the many cases
which have followed that decision, some of which are cited in a footnote
in Casimere,27 by pointing out that they concern testimony of a non-
expert layman as contrasted to the testimony of a licensed physician.
In short, the plaintiff claimed that the rule was not applicable where
an expert in the case is a clinical psychologist. In support of her posi-
tion, the plaintiff cited section 147.14(2) (b) of the Wisconsin Statutes
which permits any person to testify as an expert on a medical subject
2528 Wis. 2d 437, 137 N.W. 2d 73 (1965).
26264 Wis. 265, 58 N.W. 2d 651 (1953).
2728 Wis. 2d at 437, 137 N.W. 2d at 77.
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in any action or judicial proceeding where proof is offered satisfactory
to the court that such a person is qualified as an expert.
The plaintiff attempted to qualify McDonald as an expert by es-
tablishing his extensive educational background in psychology, his
holding a doctorate in the subject of psychology, and his practicing as a
clinical psychologist for a number of years. McDonald's qualifications
to testify were not challenged by the defendant until after the verdict.
The plaintiff, in attempting to prove that the court had previously
accepted the testimony of a psychologist alone, cited Alsteen v. Gehl,28
where the court said:
Psychiatry and clinical psychology, while not exact sciences,
can provide sufficiently reliable information relating to the ex-
tent of psychological stress, and to the causal relationship be-
tween the injury and the defendant's conduct, to enable a trier
of fact to make intelligent evaluative judgments on a plaintiff's
claim.29
The defendant did not deny the competence of the psychologist to
testify as an expert, but insisted that his testimony as an expert on
medical matters relating to the tests he conducted were mainly tools
to be used by a licensed psychiatrist to make his findings more ob-
jective. Of themselves and without the aid of the medical expert, the
defendant contended, the tests were insufficient to support an award
for future pain and suffering.
The court stated the posture of the case to be as follows:
Suffice it to say that the arguments posed by the parties
point up serious questions regarding the competence of a psy-
chologist to testify as to future pain and suffering or in regard
to other aspects of a personal-injury case having medical im-
plications when that testimony is not used as an adjunct to
the testimony of a licensed physician or psychiatrist.30
Historically, the court noted, the qualifications of an expert witness
had not been a matter of license but a matter of experience. To illus-
trate its point, the court commented on the admissibility of the testi-
mony concerning the condition of dead bodies by a non-medical coroner
who was permitted to give his opinion as to the time of death."' The
court has also allowed the testimony of lay witnesses that an applicant
for a life insurance policy was, apparently, in good health.-
In State v. Law,3 3 also cited by the court, three professors of the
University of Wisconsin Medical School, none of whom were licensed
to practice in the state as physicians, were permitted to testify as
2821 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W. 2d 312 (1963).
29 Id. at 359, 124 N.W. 2d at 317.
30 28 Wis. 2d at 441, 442; 137 N.W. 2d at 75.
31 Citing Palmer v. Schultz, 138 Wis. 445,120 N.W. 348 (1909).
32 Stanislawski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 231 Wis. 572, 286 N.W. 10 (1939).
33 150 Wis. 313. 136 N.W. 803 (1912).
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expert medical 'vitnesses that the abdominal cavity of a deceased abor-
tion victim contained, "bacteria known as strepptococcus," and that the
deceased was five or six weeks pregnant at the time of her death. The
court, in that case, said:
The mere fact that the science of medicine covers, includes,
or requires some knowledge of bacteriology, or chemistry, or
botany, or biology, or embryology would not exclude an expert
in either of these sciences. .... 3.
It was held in 1863, in Evans v. People,35 that during periods of
epidemics when lay persons were extensively exposed to disease, that
lay persons were competent to testify in regard to particular diseases
with which they were familiar.
The court, in Casimere, might have cited Milwaukee v. Antczak,36
and Milwaukee v. Johnston,37 where laymen were permitted to testify
as to intoxication. In Odya v. Quade,38 an 18 year old nurse's aide
was held competent to testify to intoxication but was held not com-
petent to testify as to shock. In Cullen v. State, 9 lay witnesses were
permitted to testify that, in their opinion, they saw blood stains. The
court applied the analogy of admissibility of opinion evidence with
respect to intoxication. In Lubner v. Peerless Insurance Co.,40 a com-
petent medical expert testified that the cause of death could not be
determined by performing a certain test on a dead body. There was
nothing in the testimony of the expert which was inherently improbable.
The court held that the testimony of a layman that he determined the
cause of death by the same type of test was not competent evidence to go
to the jury on that issue. Lubner was a case involving an alleged death
by drowning. The court carefully limited the scope of its opinion by
making it clear that the court did not decide death by drowning never
could be established by lay testimony. It was pointed out that anyone
is competent to testify to a drowning which he actually witnessed. The
court further suggested that drowning can be proved by circumstantial
evidence, such as the finding of an overturned boat, in which the per-
son claimed to have drowned was an occupant and later the discovery
of the body itself.
The cases cited indicate that the law traditionally permitted limited
testimony of a medical nature by one not licensed as a medical doctor
if he was in fact qualified as an expert. The court, in Casimere, sug-
gested that even a cursory study of the literature relating to mental
34 Id. at 328, 136 N.W. at 808.
35 12 Mich. 27 (1863).3824 Wis. 2d 480, 129 N.W. 2d 125 (1964).
37 21 Wis. 2d 411, 124 N.W. 2d 690 (1963).
384 Wis. 2d 63, 90 N.W. 2d 96 (1958).
3926 Wis. 2d 652, 133 N.W. 2d 284 (1965).
40 19 Wis. 2d 364, 120 N.W. 2d 54 (1963).
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conditions reveals that there are those who question whether all aspects
of abnormal behavior are, in fact, medical problems in the traditional
sense. In commenting upon the difference of opinion in regard to the
legitimate area of influence of the psychologist, the court said:
Considering the recent origins of psychology and psychiatry,
it is not surprising that there is a sharp difference of opinion
in regard to where the expertise of the psychologist impinges
on the exclusive domain of the psychiatrist.
It is therefore little wonder that the courts have been re-
luctant in allowing, and generally are adamant in refusing to
allow, a psychologist to "go it alone" as a witness in what
might be the realm of medicine.
41
The court did not find it necessary to decide the status of a psy-
chologist as a witness and on this point said:
However, to decide the case before us, we are not obliged to
explore the penumbra of the psychologist's expertise where some
members of this court have grave doubt as to such testimonial
competence on the part of a clinical psychologist4
2
In Casimere, it appears from the record that only testimony in re-
gard to future pain and suffering or future disability was elicited from
Dr. McDonald by the plaintiff's attorney. Upon the hypothesis that
Dr. McDonald was a qualified witness, the court held that his testi-
mony failed to meet the standard of medical certainty required by the
court. Although no particular words of art were held to be necessary
to express a degree of medical certainty required to sustain an award
for future pain and suffering, it was necessary that a reasonable in-
terpretation of the experts' word show more than a mere possibility
or conjecture. The testimony of Dr. McDonald, that it was "quite
possible" that the disability would persist for the lifetime of the plain-
tiff, did not meet the standards required. True, Dr. McDonald did
use the phrase "likely to persist" and that the condition would "very
probably" persist, but the probative effect of such testimony was sub-
stantially impaired by Dr. McDonald's statements which were incon-
sistent with the foregoing testimony. Dr. McDonald testified that if
Miss Casimere were working her condition would improve; that he
had not seen the plaintiff, except for brief intervals before the trial,
and as the result of such meeting he was not able to assess whether she
suffered from emotional disturbance at the time he saw her. Dr. Mc-
Donald further testified that the disability would persist as long as
treatment was not instituted from which it might be concluded that
the condition, if treated, was curable. The posture of the case was
such that the jury could not find to a reasonable degree of medical
41 28 Wis. 2d at 443, 137 N.W. 2d at 76.
42 1d. at 444, 137 N.W. 2d at 77.
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certainty or probability that the injury would be permanent or the
extent of future disability or pain and suffering. Lastly, the court
commented upon the absence from the record of any evidence showing
an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to mitigate damage by under-
going the treatment allegedly required to cure or ameliorate her men-
tal problem. Bearing on this subject, Dr. Groh testified that the plaintiff
admitted she did not take the prescribed course of exercises designed
to alleviate her back pains which, allegedly, became acute after the
accident and which, Dr. Groh concluded, were postural in origin. Not-
withstanding the principle that no injured person is required to undergo
surgery or treatment which is hazardous or unduly expensive, such
injured person is required to seek medical care and follow the advice
of the physician consulted in order to alleviate an injury.4 3 A defendant,
however, cannot be expected to pay for a lifetime's disability or pain
if proper medical treatment or psychotherapy can reasonably correct
plaintiff's ailments. The record in Casimere was silent with reference
to the probable duration of treatment or its cause. The court there-
fore concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain an award
of any damages for future pain and suffering or for permanent or
future disability.
THE DEMISE OF KATH v. WISCONSIN CENTRAL R. Co.
For many years one of the difficulties inherent in the trial of a
personal injury action related to the testimony of an expert medical
witness which consisted, in part, of subjective symptoms given by the
patient. In Kath v. Wisconsin Central R. Co.," the court stated that in
Keller v. The Town of Gilman,45 there was an attempt made to formu-
late the rules governing the admission or rejection of evidence as to
subjective symptoms of a patient in a way which should cover all cases.
The court in Kath, however, observed that the attempt was futile and
that "the present contention shows how futile the attempt was." In
Keller, the court stated that evidence of subjective symptoms might be
introduced in evidence when made tb a physician for the purpose of
treatment but could not be admitted when made to an expert after an
action was brought in order to enable him to testify as a witness at
the trial. The court, in Kath, further observed that the rule seemed to
be clear enough "until a case is presented like the present, where the
statements are made both for the bona fide purpose of treatment
and to enable the physician to testify as an expert on the trial." On
principle, the court thought such testimony should not be admitted. It
seemed to the court that there was no difference between the intro-
43 Collova v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 535, 99 N.W. 2d 740
(1959).
44121 Wis. 503, 99 N.W. 217 (1904).
45 93 Wis. 9, 66 N.W. 800 (1896).
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duction in evidence of subjective symptoms when made to a doctor
both for the purpose of treatment and for trial and statements made
to a physician for the sole purpose of enabling the witness to testify
as an expert.
There was-an attempt to erode the principle of the Kath case in
Schields v. Fredrick.46 In that case the court held that ordinarily the
opinion of a physician based upon subjective symptoms related to him
by the injured during the course of an examination by him, for the
purpose of testifying rather than for the purpose of treatment, was
not admissible in evidence. The plaintiff conceded the rule but sought
to avoid the effect of the admission of hearsay testimony on the plea
that the person whose injury was being inquired into testified to the
facts stated by the physician on which he based his opinion relating
to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries and, therefore, the
admission of such evidence was not prejudicial. The court, however,
could not find that the testimony supporting the contention was in the
record.
In La Fave v. Lemke,47 La Fave's doctor testified that La Fave told
him he wanted attention because his back and leg hurt. The court held
there was no error because the statement was no more than a direction
of the doctor's attention to the parts of the body to be examined. The
examination produced a wealth of objective facts confirming the pres-
ence of pain and the doctor's expert opinion concerning it. There was
no reception of hearsay evidence such as was held objectionable in the
Schields case, or in Kath.
In Michalski v. Wagner,48 the trial court sustained an objection to
any testimony of the plaintiff's doctor relating to subjective symptoms
communicated by the plaintiff to the doctor. The basis of the objection
was that such statements by the plaintiff to the doctor were self-serving
declarations made after the plaintiff consulted an attorney. In sustain-
ing the objection, the trial court relied on Kath. The plaintiff contended
the trial court committed error because the plaintiff's statements of
subjective symptoms were obtained by the doctor in order for him to
properly treat the plaintiff. The defendants urged that the plaintiff was
precluded from raising the objection because of his failure to present
the question in his motions after verdict. Upon that ground, the court
sustained the position of the defendant. There was an overtone in the
opinion which might be interpreted as a tendency on the part of the
court to otherwise sustain the plaintiff's position.
In Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co.,49 Drs. Verdone and Ansfield were
46 232 Wis. 595, 288 N.W. 241 '(1939).
4 3 Wis. 2d 502, 89 N.W. 2d 312 (1958).
489 XWis. 2d 22, 100 N.W. 2d 354 (1960).
49 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W. 2d 393 (1960).
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employed after suit was commenced for the purpose of giving testi-
mony, rather than treatment. Dr. Verdone based his opinion partly on
subjective symptoms and Dr. Ansfield's estimate of disability was based
entirely on the subjective complaints of the plaintiff. The court re-
peated the principle laid down in Schields, but indicated that the weak-
ness of the contention of the defendants, that the testimony was not
admissible lay in the failure to object to the testimony at the time it
was introduced. It also appeared that Dr. Ansfield's testimony with
respect to five (5%) per cent disability of the plaintiff and the factors
upon which he based his opinion, together with his opinion that there
would be no future change in the condition of the plaintiff's knee, was
part of his testimony on direct examination, when he was being ex-
amined by the defendant's counsel. The court then characterized the
rule of the Schields and Kath cases as one which was restricted to the
admissibility of evidence only and that once opinion evidence based
upon subjective symptoms got into the record without objection, it
might be considered by the jury in arriving at their verdict.
In Thompson v. Nee,50 the court held that Kath did not over-rule
Keller v. The Town of Gilman.51 In the Keller case the court held that
statements of subjective symptoms might be given in evidence when
made to a physician for the purpose of treatment but not when made
to an expert after action was brought to enable the doctor to testify as
a witness at the trial. The court, in Thompson, held that the record
did not present a situation as in Kath, where the doctor was retained
for the dual purpose of providing medical expert testimony. The court
made the point that if the physician is originally employed solely for
the purpose of treatment it was immaterial that thereafter the injured
person might have retained an attorney.
The decision in Thompson was foreshadowed in Rasmussen v.
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co.- The court there held the fact that a
person had retained counsel in relation to a possible lawsuit growing
out of the injury producing event before consulting a physician did not,
in and of itself, support an inference that the plaintiff sought an ob-
jective other than treatment when he consulted the physician.
In Plesk? v. Milwaukee,53 the plaintiff related subjective symptoms
to Dr. Montgomery, both in connection with his treatment and also the
day before trial. The plaintiff had retained an attorney before he saw
Dr. Montgomery. The court held that the fact that the plaintiff had
consulted Dr. Montgomery for treatment after she had retained an
attorney was not controlling. The court, however, did hold that the
50 12 Wis. 2d 326, 107 N.W. 2d 150 (1961).
51 Supra note 45.
52 264 Wis. 432, 59 N.W. 2d 457 (1953).
53 19 Wis. 2d 210. 120 N.W. 2d 130 (1963).
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subjective symptoms related to Dr. Montgomery the day before trial,
were inadmissible because of the proximity of the doctor's report to
the trial.
In Ritter v. Coca-Cola Co., 4 the erosion of Kath became complete
and, thereafter, Kath ceased to have vitality. In Ritter the court re-
viewed a number of the decisions following Kath and stated that the
holding in Kath had been retained while at the same time a doctor was
allowed to testify to a patient's subjective symptoms recited to him
during a consultation. Such a consultation may have been arranged for
a two-fold purpose of treatment and examination before testimony,
or the court may have ruled that the sole motivation of the plaintiff
in arranging for the consultation was treatment. The court then ad-
ministered the coup de grace to Kath:
We see no logic in continuing adherence to the Kath rule
and conclude that if the trial court determines that a consulta-
tion is made by a claimant with a physician for the bona fide
purpose of treatment, the fact that the claimant also de-
sires to utilize the physician as a witness on the trial in relation
to his injury will not preclude the physician from testifying as
to the patient's report of his subject symptoms or from predi-
cating medical conclusions upon such reports.
Such a change in the Kath rule simply recognizes the
realities of modern medical practice in the clinical diagnosis of
a patient's condition alleged to be due to the injury causing
event and prescribing treatment to such condition. Every physi-
cian consulting with the patient who is alleged to have been
injured takes the patient's history and makes his diagnosis based
not only on his objective findings made on examination, but
also with due regard to the statements made by the patient both
as to his history and as to his subjective complaints. The physi-
cian brings to the diagnosis his clinical evaluative skills, which
he has acquired through rigorous professional training and ex-
tensive clinical experience.
The rationale of the Kath rule regards statements made
by the patient to the physician as hearsay and in the nature of
self-serving declarations. Kath allows testimony concerning
such statements where made to a physician while undergoing
treatment, but excludes the testimony where dual motivation is
established. This distinction is unrealistic. If the testimony on
statements made in one context is admissible then logically such
testimony should also be admissible where the statements are
made in the other context.
As long as a patient goes to a physician with the bona
fide purpose of receiving treatment, the basic desire of a
patient to get well, we believe, will generally motivate him to
tell the truth and this is sufficient reason to allow the attending
physician to testify about statements made to him which may
54 24 Wis. 2d 157, 128 N.W. 2d 439 (1964).
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touch on his history and his subjective symptoms. Cross-exami-
nation and argument are available to opposing counsel as a
means of testing such testimony.5-
One further observation is appropriate in connection with Ritter.
In a footnote, the court said that "The physician may nevertheless
give his medical opinion on the basis of a proper hypothetical question,
which is predicated on the subjective symptoms if such have been
put in evidence by the direct testimony of the claimant." 56 The plaintiff
thus has the tools at hand upon which to predicate an expert medical
opinion on subjective symptoms. Such symptoms may all be incorpor-
ated in a hypothetical question with the result that the jury will be in-
formed of the expert's opinion.
In Felkl v. Classified Risk Ins. Corp.,57 the treating doctor in a
personal injury case sent his patient to Dr. Salinsky, a specialist in
orthopedics, for diagnosis. Dr. Salinsky examined the plaintiff, took
x-rays and made a report to the treating doctor. The treatment was
prescribed directly by the treating doctor, who saw the plaintiff fre-
quently. The court permitted Dr. Salinsky to testify concerning the
history given by the plaintiff and the plaintiff's subjective complaints.
The defendant objected to Dr. Salinsky's testimony on subjective
matters because he was an examining doctor and not a treating doctor.
The defendant made no effort to show that the plaintiff went to Dr.
Salinsky for the purpose of enabling Dr. Salinsky to testify in the
action. The court concluded, therefore, that under the decision in
Ritter, Dr. Salinsky's testimony was properly admitted.
The final chapter, of course, has not been written in connection
with subjective symptoms, but in Wegerer v. Koehler,58 the trial court
concluded that Dr. Salinsky's services were procured exclusively for
the purpose of his giving testimony. Since Dr. Salinsky did not pur-
port to treat any of the plaintiffs, he was not entitled to testify to
subjective symptoms under the principle established in Ritter.
To WHAT DEGREE OF DEFINITENESS MUST THE TESTIMONY OF A
MEDICAL WITNESS CONFORM IN ORDER TO BE ADMISSIBLE
At the threshhold of the discussion, three decisions of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court should serve to chart the path of admissibility
of the testimony of medical experts. The leading case is Hallunm v.
Onzro.5 9 Two additional cases serve as a prelude to the discussion which
follows: The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Currie, in Miller Ras-
5 Id. at 164, 128 N.W. 2d at 443.56 24 Wis. 2d at 163, 128 N.W. 2d at 442.
5724 Wis. 2d 595, 129 N.W. 2d 222 (1964).
58 28 Wis. 2d 241, 137 N.W. 2d 115 (1965).
59 122 Wis. 337, 99 N.W. 1051 (1904).
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mussen. Ice & Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm.,"° and State v. Industrial
Comm.61 These decisions unmistakably lay down the rule that the testi-
mony of a medical expert must be to a reasonable medical certainty
or a reasonable medical probability. Speaking generally, it may be said
that the supreme court has followed Hallum,62 but the rule has been
stated in substantiahy the same manner, but with different terminology.
In Molinaro v. Industrial Comm.,6 3 the court held that an award
of the Industrial Commission could not be based upon possibilities. In
this case, the applicant contended that she sustained an injury from
a falling shoe and last, which combination weighed around 2Y pounds.
The doctor testified that there was only a remote possibility that the
falling shoe caused the injury. In Shymanski v. Industrial Comm., 64
the term "perhaps" used by a doctor connoted possibility rather than
probability. The court held that an award of the Industrial Commission
could not be sustained upon such testimony.
Smee v. Checker Cab Co.,as was a case involving a brain injury.
The plaintiff testified that he had had headaches over a four year
period following the accident. This was consistent with the medical
testimony that concussions cause head pain and that such pain may
persist for some time. The court observed that the statements of the
plaintiff were not entitled to great weight, especially when unsupported
by medical testimony which, in this case, the court described as
"sketchy." Nevertheless, the court held that the medical testimony
was sufficient to support an inference that the accident caused fre-
quent headaches.
In Meyer v. Fronimades,66 evidence of persistent headaches con-
sisted entirely of plaintiff's subjective statement. The doctor's testi-
mony, based upon a mere "possibility" that the headaches resulted from
the injury, was held by the court to have no probative value.
In Sawdey v. Schwenk, 67 the court, following Diemel v. Weirich,6
held that future medical expense must be supported by expert medical
testimony. The court did not pass upon the question whether future
medical expense must be established by dollars and cents. In Sawdey,
the maximum expense which it was anticipated would be required
was supported by the evidence. In this case there was competent medi-
cal testimony to indicate permanent disability of 20% to 25% of the
body as a whole.
6O 263 Wis. 538, 57 N.W. 2d 736 (1953).
61272 Wis. 409, 76 N.W. 2d 362 (1956).
A, Supra note 59.
63 273 Wis. 129, 76 N.W. 2d 547 (1956).
64274 Wis. 307, 79 N.W. 2d 640 (1956).
65 1 Wis. 2d 202, 83 N.W. 2d 492 (1957).
6 2 Wis. 2d 89, 86 N.W. 2d 25 (1957).
672 Wis. 2d 522,87 N.W. 2d 500 (1958).
"cs Supra note 26.
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In the much-cited Kowalke v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,69
the court held that the testimony of Dr. Huth that "All I can say is
there is a possibility," that an arthritic condition had been aggravated
was not sufficient to sustain a jury's award for permanent disability.
It appeared, however, that another doctor who examined the patient
a week before the trial testified that, in his opinion, to a reasonable
medical certainty, the accident did aggravate the pre-existing osteo-
arthritic condition, "and may even be permanent." The court held that
it was for the jury to determine the weight to be given to the con-
flicting opinion.
In Johnson v. Industrial Comm.,7 0 the court held that the testimony
of a doctor must be to a medical certainty or at least to reasonable
medical probability.
In Rudy v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co.,71 the medical testimony
did not establish a probability of source of infection but such source
was left in the realm of speculation. Consequently, the testimony was
inadmissible.
Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co.,72 was an action by a
mongoloid for damages sustained in the pre-natal period and while
the child was nonviable. In this case there was conflicting testimony
by the experts. It was contended that the trauma resulting from an
automobile accident caused the mongoloid birth. However, it appeared
that under one theory of mongolism, it was possible that the mother
was so injured so as to cause the birth of a mongoloid. It also appeared
from the medical testimony that there are causes of mongolism not
known to medical science. The court held that there was not sufficient
medical evidence to sustain an award in favor of the mongoloid.
In Unruh v. Industrial Comm., 73 Dr. Ansfield's testimony was pref-
aced by the words, "feel" or "felt." The court stated that it had not
previously passed on the question, although it had accepted "liable,"
"likely," and "probable" as words connoting reasonable probability as
opposed to a possibility. The court also commented that it had rejected
the word "perhaps" and "impressions" amounting to "might be." Dr.
Ansfield's testimony was held to be sufficiently definite. In Michalski
v. Wagner,7 4 the court held that medical testimony to a "possibility"
was not sufficient. Wright v. Industrial Comm.,7" was a case where the
medical experts testified that, in their opinion, the incident "could have"
produced a brain condition. The court held that the testimony ex-
69 3 Wis. 2d 389, 88 N.AW. 2d 747 (1958).
70 5 Wis. 2d 584, 93 N... 2d 439 (1958).
7' 5 WAris. 2d 37, 92 N.W. 2d 367 (1958).
728 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W. 2d 163 (1959).
73 8 Wis. 2d 394, 99 N.W. 2d 182 (1959).
749 Wis. 2d 22, 100 N.W. 2d 354 (1960).
75 10 Wis. 2d 653, 103 N.W. 2d 531 (1960).
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pressed a mere possibility which was insufficient to sustain a finding
in favor of the applicant.
In Hintz v. Mielke,6 it was contended that atrophy of the plaintiff's
brain resulted from his injury. There was conflicting medical testimony,
Dr. Henry Suckle, a neurosurgeon, testified that the atrophy of the
cerebellum resulted from the accident. Dr. R. H. Quade testified that
he was of the opinion the accident could not possibly have caused the
changes. The jury found that the accident did not cause the atrophy
and judgment was, therefore, entered in favor of the defendant.
In Freven v. Brenner,77 the testimony of a doctor that the accident
could have produced a hearing loss was held not to be equivalent to
reasonable certainty and was, therefore, inadmissible.
In Engstrom v. Dewitz,8M the court held that there was no evidence
to support a finding that the accident caused the injury where one of
the doctors testified that it was a "mere possibility" that the accident
caused the injury.
In Rogers v. Adams,79 the doctor was not asked whether, in his
opinion, the back condition of the plaintiff was permanent. The court
commented that the doctor did testify as to acceleration of the osteo-
arthritic process in the plaintiff's back which would probably continue
in the future. The court reasoned that if the accident accelerated and
activated the osteoarthritic condition so as to prevent the plaintiff from
doing heavy manual work even at the time of the trial, the continuance
of such acceleration of the degenerative process was probable in the
future. The court, therefore, concluded that the testimony would sup-
port a conclusion by the jury that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from
the accident and that the injury would probably prevent him from
doing heavy work in the future.
In Bleyer v. Gross,80 the court reiterated what was said in Sawdey,81
that future medical expense must be supported by competent medical
evidence. In Bleyer, it was contended that the medical evidence was
insufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but the court
held that the expert testimony adduced was not in terms of "possibili-
ties" but rather in terms of "probabilities."
In Perlson v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co.,8 the plaintiff was in an
automobile accident in 1955. As a result of the symptoms which de-
veloped, an operation was performed between the fourth and fifth lum-
bar vertebra and an intervertebral disc was removed. In 1958, the
76 15 Wis. 2d 258, 112 N.W. 2d 720 (1961).
7716 Wis. 2d 445, 114 N.W. 2d 782 (1962).
78 18 Wis. 2d 421, 118 N.W. 2d 710 (1963).
79 19 Wis. 2d 141, 119 N.W. 2d 349 (1963).
SO 19 Wis. 2d 305, 120 N.W. 2d 156 (1963).31 Supra note 67.
223 Wis. 2d 391, 127 N.W. 2d 69 (1964).
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plaintiff was in another automobile accident. In 1961, another operation
was performed for a "recurrent herniated disc and a herniated disc
below the fifth lumbar vertebra." In 1962, a spinal fusion operation
was performed from the fourth lumbar to the sacrum. One of the
doctors testified, over objection, that in his opinion the 1958 accident
was "a factor in lighting up his [plaintiff's] symptoms and reinjuring
the disc," and that "the accident was a factor in producing the second
herniation and therefore there is a relationship between whatever re-
sults permanently and that accident." The court suggested that the
opinions expressed in terms of a reasonable degree of medical proba-
bility were sufficient to support a jury finding. It appeared undisputed
that in 1957 two of the doctors found that the plaintiff was 25% dis-
abled from the 1955 accident. The doctors proceeded upon the as-
sumption that an intervertebral disc can be regenerated. Notwithstand-
ing the assumption, the court in Perlson3 held that the testimony of
the doctors was sufficient to sustain a finding that the 1958 injury re-
sulted in a reherniation of the intervertebral disc between L 4 and L 5.
In Olson v. Siordia,8 4 a doctor testified that the fracture sustained
by one of the plaintiffs "could very well have been caused as a result
of the automobile accident." The court concluded that the testimony
of the doctor regarding the causal connection between the fracture and
the accident was stated in terms of a reasonable medical certainty,
notwithstanding the fact that the doctor used the words, "could very
well have." This is contrary to the Wright s and Freuen8 decisions.
An attempt has been made to analyze all of the decisions relating
to the sufficiency of medical testimony to sustain a finding of disability,
future pain and suffering and medical expense. The decisions indicate
that, generally speaking, the testimony should be to a reasonable medical
certainty or reasonable medical probability. The court, however, does
not base its decisions on semantics but upon the reasonable interpreta-
tion of the opinions of the doctors. If it reasonably appears that the
opinion expressed is in the realm of reasonable medical certainty or
reasonably medical probability, the testimony of the doctor will support
an Industrial Commission finding or a jury verdict. On the other hand,
if the tenor of the testimony leaves the impression that the testimony
of the doctor is in the realm of possibility or speculation, the testimony
of the doctor will be held to be insufficient.
WAIVER OF PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
In 39 Marquette Law Review 289, 308, the physician-patient pri-
vilege was discussed and the following statement was made: "It should
83 Ibid.
8425 Wis. 2d 274, 130 N.W. 2d 827 (1964).85 Supra note 75.
86 Supra note 77.
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be noted in passing that when the injured party puts a medical witness
on the witness stand, the privilege conferred by section 325.21 no longer
exists." The decision in Cretney v. Woodmen Accident Co.,87 was cited
as authority for the statement. In the recent case of Alexander v.
Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,88 the court cited, with approval,
the decision in Cretney:
It would be most unjust and unfair to permit patients or their
heirs to waive the privilege as to testimony of a physician who
was favorable to their interest and claim the benefit of the privi-
lege as to a physician similarly situated who might not be favor-
able to their interest. When consent is given for the disclosure
by one physician the reason for the statute no longer exists, and
the waiver is a waiver of the whole privilege and not a consent
to the introduction of the testimony of designated witnesses.8 9
The court in Alexander" stated that section 269.57(1) of the Wis-
consin Statutes was a remedial statute which should be liberally con-
strued while section 325.21 was to be strictly construed. The court
cited, as its authority, Culligan, Inc. v. Rheaume,91 and Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Kozlowski.92
In the Alexander case it was contended that section 325.21, relating
to the physician-patient privilege, was controlling over any right of
inspection which might be acquired under section 269.57(1). The Wis-
consin Supreme Court rejected the contention and held that the physi-
cian's exemption from disclosure should, in reason, be limited to such
disclosures as would injure the patient's feelings or reputation. The
court held that Mrs. Alexander, the plaintiff, was compelled under sec-
tion 269.57(1) to produce a consulting doctor's medical report for in-
spection by the defendant. In this case, it appeared that Mrs. Alexander
had signed a consent under section 325.21 for the inspection of hos-
pital and medical records. The consent was directed to Drs. Pearson
and Suckle, St. Clare's Hospital and St. Mary's Ringling Hospital.
During the examination of Dr. Pearson's records, the defendant's coun-
sel learned that Dr. Suckle's report had been removed. The trial court
held that the defendant was entitled to inspect the Suckle report and
the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed.
There is no logical or practical reason why the filing of the complaint
in a personal injury action should not be equivalent to the signing of a
consent to inspect medical records. The hospital records are not privi-
leged as the court held in Leusink v .O'Donnell,93 and Thompson v.
0196 Wis. 29, 219 N.W. 448 (1928).
''25 Wis. 2d 623, 131 N.W. 2d 373 (1964).
6 Cretney v. Woodmen Accident Co., supra note 87 at 35, 36, cited in Alex-
ander v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., supra note 88 at 628.
90 Supra note 88.91268 Wis. 298, 67 N.W. 2d 279 (1954).
92 226 Wis. 641, 276 N.W. 300 (1937).
93 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W. 2d 675 (1949).
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Roberts."' The hospital records, thus subject to inspection, may relate
not only to the incidents which gave rise to the suit but may also relate
to conditions before the accident complained of.95
Hospital records contain diagnoses, operation reports, progress
notes, records of drugs prescribed and nurse's notes. The hospital
records disclose the names of the treating and examining doctors. At
least to the extent outlined by the hospital records, the depositions of
the doctors for discovery purposes under section 326.12 may be takenPs
The plaintiff is amply protected with respect to such depositions by
section 326.12(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes. Subsection (3) provides
that upon motion seasonably made by a party or by the person to be
examined, the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken or
that certain matters shall not be inquired into and may enter any other
order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoy-
ance, embarrassment or oppression. Finally, the court has ample power
under the provisions of section 269.65, the pre-trial procedure, to enter
and enforce orders which will facilitate the defining of issues and
providing for prompt and adequate preparation for trial.
How MAY HOSPITAL REcoRDs BE USED
In Zweifel v. Milwaukee Automobile Mut. Ins. Co.,9 7 it was con-
tended that the trial court committed error in refusing to allow the
jury to consider the hospital report of Rowley, the plaintiff's guest
driver. The record contained the notation, "old healed fract of nose
with septal deviation," under the heading of "Diagnosis." The trial
court admitted the hospital record in evidence but refused to allow the
report to go to the jury. In holding that the trial court did not commit
error in such refusal, the court said:
Whether or not an exhibit should be submitted to the jury is
a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Although there
might be situations where it is imperative that the jury have the
opportunity to study a report, this was not such a case. Appellant
was not seriously injured and the facts relating to his injury
and treatment were fully brought out in the testimony.98
The court stated that section 327.25(2) permitted the introduction of
hospital records except for portions which constituted a medical opin-
ion or diagnosis.
There is presently a conflict in the statutes. Chapters 256 and 459
of the Laws of 1963 repealed and re-enacted section 327.25. As re-
enacted, section 327.25 provides that hospital records may be introduced
in evidence as business records, substantially as provided by section
94269 Wis. 472, 69 N.W. 2d 482 (1955).
9 5 Supra note 88.
96 See State ex rel Reynolds v. Circuit Court, 15 Wis. 2d 311, 112 N.W. 2d 686(1961); Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d 152, 127 N.W. 2d 73 (1964).
97 28 Wis. 2d 249, 137 N.W. 2d 6 (1965).
98 Id. at 260, 261; 137 N.W. 2d at 13.
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1732 of Title 28, U.S. Code. By order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
dated May 6, 1963, effective July 15, 1963, section 327.25(2) was
amended to provide for the introduction in evidence, as business records,
medical and hospital records. The statute applies only to entries made
in medical or hospital records, if the entries relate to "treatment given
or examination conducted." Statements made in the medical report or
hospital records relating to anything except treatment given or exami-
nation conducted are inadmissable. This means that statements in rela-
tion to the manner in which an accident occurred, to give a frequent
example, could be excluded from any medical or hospital records in-
troduced in evidence.
The entries in medical and hospital records must be confined under
the statute to treatment given or examination conducted in this state.
This exclusionary provision would preclude the court from admitting
into evidence, for example, medical records made in the Mayo Clinic
or St. Mary's Hospital in Rochester, Minnesota.
There is a further aspect of the problem which could arise fre-
quently. Does the statute permit the introduction in evidence of notes
made by a doctor in his office to examination and treatment of the
patient? In Rupp v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,99 Milwaukee Circuit
Court Judge Elmer Roller refused to admit hospital records and the
office records of Dr. Frederick Krueger, who was deceased at the time
of the trial. The hospital records sought to be introduced contained con-
clusions and opinions which were not identified by the doctors who
made them. The office records of Dr. Krueger were made out princi-
pally in the doctor's handwriting, some of which were illegible even to
his secretary. It is submitted that Judge Roller's decision properly dis-
posed of the evidential issue presented. The Rupp case was cited with
approval and followed by the court in United States F. & G. Co. v.
Milwaukee & S. T. Corp.,10 0 and in Chapnitsky v. McClone.1' 1
There is an extended discussion of the admissibility of hospital
records in the April, 1963 issue of the Insurance Counsel Journal,
Volume 10, No. 2, Page 240, in which the Rupp case and two recent
decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Thomas v. Hogan,'10 2 and Kissinger v. Frankhouser,1°0 are analyzed
by the author of this article.
Trial judges are concerned with questions of policy concerning the
introduction of medical and hospital records. In Zweifel v. Milwaukee
Automobile Mut. Ins. Co.,' 04 as previously commented, the supreme
court has held that whether medical and hospital records should be sub-
99 17 Wis. 2d 16, 115 N.W. 2d 612 (1962).
100 18 Wis. 2d 1, 117 N.W. 2d 708 (1962).
10120 Wis. 2d 453, 122 N.W. 2d 400 (1963).
102 308 F. 2d 355 (1962).
103 308 F. 2d 348 (1962).
104 Supra note 97.
[Vol. 49
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
mitted to the jury rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. It is
hoped that Wisconsin trial judges and attorneys may find assistance
in this article, in properly solving some of the questions which arise
in personal injury cases. It is suggested that the court should, in every
case, give careful consideration not only in the admission of the hos-
pital records but particularly in permitting the records to go to the jury
room. Many cases may readily be suggested where the sending of the
medical and hospital records to the jury room would result in con-
fusion. Questions of interpretation of the medical terms used continual-
ly perplex both the trial judges and the attorneys. The progress notes
in many of the hospital records, without meticulous explanation, would
be completely unintelligible to the jury. The hospital records contain
records of medication. The bewildering array of narcotics, tranqui-
lizers and drugs required for heart conditions would be incompre-
hensible to anyone unless he had access to a medical dictionary. High
blood pressure, atherosclerosis and other diseases in the field of geri-
atrics must give one pause before submitting such abstruse matters to
the jury in the form of medical and hospital records.
Finally, there are in many hospital records matters which might
result in embarrassment and humiliation. Such a situation in a mild
form appeared in Huss v. Vande Hey. 05 In this case it appeared that
in connection with a Wassermann test, the question arose concerning
the use of bismuth. The inference might be drawn that the plaintiff
had venereal disease, particularly in connection with a pre-marital re-
port of physical examination. Such matters which have no relevancy
should certainly be excluded from jury consideration. In fact, in the
Huss"' , case, the court held that a record of a pre-trial Wassermann
test filed in the county clerk's office ought not to have been introduced
in evidence. The court cited Estate of Eannelli,07 Voigt v. Voigt,108
and Jacobson v. Bryan.:0 9 These cases hold that statements of conclu-
sions contained in official records are not admissible. Upon the author-
ity of Zweifel,"0 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held the admission
of the clerk's record was erroneous, but under the circumstances, not
prejudicial.
USE OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE INCLUDING CHARTS, MODELS
AND BLACKBOARDS
In Hernke v. Northern Ins. Co.,""' the trial court refused to permit
the introduction in evidence of a chart of the muscles of the body and
a model skeleton of a spinal column made out of plastic. The Wiscon-
305 29 Wis. 2d 34, 138 N.W. 2d 192 (1965).
106 Ibid.
107 274 Wis. 193, 80 N.W. 2d 240 (1956).
10s 22 Wis. 2d 573, 126 N.W. 2d 543 (1964).
109 244 Wis. 359, 12 N.W. 2d 789 (1944).
110 Supra note 97.
" 20 Wis. 2d 352, 122 N.W. 2d 395 (1963).
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sin Supreme Court held that whether or not demonstrative evidence
is to be received rests largely in the discretion of the trial court and
cited Walker v. Baker,12 and Gordon, Demonstrative Evidence, 32 Wis-
consin Bar Bulletin 11 (February, 1959). The court commented that
many people learn and understand better with their eyes than they do
with their ears and suggested that the alignment of bones and muscles
is sufficiently obscure to the average juror as to make a visual demon-
stration helpful. The court concluded that it would have been prefer-
able for the trial court to have permitted the use of the chart and
skeleton.
In Walker v. Baker,"'s the trial court admitted photographs of the
plaintiff to show his physical condition shortly after the accident. The
supreme court suggested that it would have been better if the trial
court had not included the photographs, especially the one showing the
plaintiff's teeth with a wired jaw, as such photographs might tend to
inflame the jury. Nevertheless, the supreme court held that the admis-
sion of the photographs was largely a question left to the discretion of
the trial judge and that under the circumstances there was no abuse
of discretion in admitting the photographs.
In Bellart v. Martell,"4 the supreme court held that there was no
abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting the plaintiff to show
the amputation of the right hand two inches above the wrist and the
amputation of the left leg well above the knee. The trial court, in this
case, permitted the plaintiff to demonstrate the use of prosthetic devices
which included a shoulder harness worn on the left shoulder used in
controlling the hook on the prosthesis of the right arm.
In the category of demonstrative evidence, there is the blackboard
and its proper use. In Affett v. Milwaukee & S. T. Corp.,"1 5 the court
adopted the practice approved by the New Jersey court in Botta v.
Brunner."6 In that case the New Jersey court refused to permit the
the plaintiff's attorney to argue to the jury on allowance for pain and
suffering based on per diem amounts. The court did say that it found
no objection to the use of a blackboard as an aid to illustrate or dem-
onstrate the course of proper argumentation upon the hypotheses that
what the ear may hear, the eye may see. The court stated that it was
proper for plaintiff's counsel to state and argue the amount of future
pain and suffering which he believed the evidence would fairly and
reasonably sustain, but that the amount could not be referred to as the
amount in the ad damnum clause. Although the ad damnum had no
probative value and was no part of the evidence, the court did suggest
112 13 Wis. 2d 637, 109 N.W. 2d 499 (1961).
113 Ibid.
11428 Wis. 2d 686, 137 N.W. 2d 729 (1965).
115 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W. 2d 274 (1960).11626 N.J. 82, 138 A. 2d 713 (1958).
[Vol. 49
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
that counsel for both the plaintiff and the defendant may make an
argumentative suggestion and summation from the evidence of a lump
sum dollar amount for pain and suffering. The court forbade counsel
from arguing the amount arrived at on the basis of a mathematical
formula or on a per day, per month or on any other time-segment basis.
In Halsted v. Kosnar,117 the court held that although there should
be broad latitude regarding the lump sum which counsel may urge upon
the jurors for pain and suffering, it did not follow that appeals to
passion might be made in connection with damages.
In Walker v. Baker,"8 the court held that plaintiff's counsel was
not acting improperly when in his final argument to the jury, he said,
"I am asking you to consider $25,000." The Walker" 9 case was cited
with approval in Halsted z. Kosnar,120 and Doolittle v. Western States
Mut. Ins. Co.,' 2
It may be that either the court or counsel or both may desire to have
a copy of the writing on the blackboard preserved as a part of the record.
The proper method of taking care of the situation is to have the black-
board photographed but as the court said in Affett, 22 this should not
be done in the presence of the jury. Experience has demonstrated that
large sheets of paper which may be tacked to an easel are more satis-
factory than the blackboard since the paper may be marked as an ex-
hibit and thereby preserved as a part of the record.
Parenthetically, it should be remarked that section 270.202 of the
Wisconsin Statutes regulates the use of photographs. The statute was
referred to in connection with section 251.251(10) in Keplin v. Hard-
ware Mut. Casualty Co.,' 2 where the court did suggest that there must
now be compliance with section 270.202.
WHAT MEDICAL PROOF Is NECESSARY To SUSTAIN A VERDICT FOR
FUTURE MEDICAL ATTENTION, FUTURE PERMANENT
DISABILITY AND FUTURE PAIN
AND SUFFERING
In Diemel v. Weirich,12 4 the court said:
It is a rare personal-injury case indeed in which the
injured party at time of trial does not claim to have some residual
pain from the accident. Not being a medical expert, such witness
is incompetent to express an opinion as to how long such pain is
going to continue in the future. The members of juries also being
laymen should not be permitted to speculate how long, in their
opinion, they think such pain will continue in the future, and fix
11718 Wis. 2d 348, 118 N.W. 2d 864 (1963).
11s Supra note 112.
19 Ibid.
120 18 Wis. 2d 348, 118 N.W. 2d 864 (1963).
1'24 Wis. 2d 135, 128 N.W. 2d 403 (1964).
122 Supra note 115.
1224 Wis. 2d 319, 129 N.W. 2d 321 (1964).
124 264 Wis. 265, 58 N.W. 2d 651 (1953).
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damages therefor accordingly. Only a medical expert is qualified
to express an opinion to a medical certainty, or based on medical
probabilities (not mere possibilities), as to whether the pain will
continue in the future, and, if so, for how long a period it will
so continue. In the absence of such expert testimony . .. the
jury should be instructed that no damages may be allowed for
future pain and suffering.125
Despite the clarity with which the court has annunciated the rule,
the propriety of an allowance for future disability and future pain and
suffering has arisen with great frequency. In Huss v. Vande Hey, 26
none of the defendants' medical witnesses expressed any opinion re-
lating to permanency or to future pain and suffering. The plaintiff's
physician had testified that as a result of the accident, the plaintiff sus-
tained injuries to the arthritic spurs on his spine, injuries to his back
and chest muscles and contusions of the hand and knee. When asked
about his prognosis, the plaintiff's doctor testified that the prognosis
was guarded, that the plaintiff's condition could be aggravated by ac-
cidents, over-work, by sudden twists or falls, or any of these things
and that he could have pain again. The defendants requested the court
to instruct the jury that no damage could be awarded for permanent
disability. The trial court refused such request and instructed the jury
that they could make an allowance for future pain and suffering if
they were convinced by the greater weight of the credible evidence
that the plaintiff was reasonably certain to suffer in the future as a
natural consequence of the injury he had sustained. The defendants
urged that the record was devoid of medical proof that the plaintiff's
injuries would be permanent, but, the trial court declined to instruct
the jury regarding the absence of any permanent injury.
The supreme court commented in Diemel v. Weirich,'1 7 and held
that with regard to an injury which was subjective in character, it was
necessary that damages for a permanent injury or for future pain and
suffering be supported by the opinion of a medical expert based on
medical certainty or medical probability. The court in Huss cited with
approval the language of the Diemel case, where the court said: "In
the absence of such expert testimony ... the jury should be instructed
that no damages may be allowed for future pain and suffering.' 128
The court, in Huss, further commented that the Diemel rule had
been followed in a number of subsequent cases. In Rogers v. Adas,129
the court held that before an award could be made for future pain,
suffering, and disability, there must be competent medical testimony to
support the same.
125 Id. at 268, 269, 58 N.W. 2d at 652.
126 Supra note 105.
127 Supra note 124.
128 Id. at 268, 58 N.W. 2d at 653.
12519 Wis. 2d 141, 119 N.W. 2d 349 (1963).
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In Lucas v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., Ma the court
said:
In analyzing the testimony as to the existence of any per-
manency of the injury or the likelihood that the injured person
will endure future pain and suffering before recovery may be
allowed therefor, there should be competent objective medical
findings and the unsupported subjective statements of the injured
party are not sufficient.' 3 '
In Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co.,"n the court followed the Diemel
case and pointed out that where an injury is subjective in character
and of such nature that a layman cannot, with reasonable certainty,
know whether or not there will be future pain and suffering, there
must be competent expert opinion testimony bearing on the permanency
of such injury or the likelihood that the injured person will endure
future pain and suffering before recovery may be allowed therefor.
The unsupported subjective statements of the injured party, who is not
a medical expert, is not sufficient to support a finding of permanency.
In Peterson v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 33 the court cited
and followed Diemel and concluded that the jury's award was not
supported by evidence of impairment of earning capacity or pain and
suffering which elapsed between the injury and the trial. Some unknown
portion was based upon speculation as to the future; but, it was im-
possible to determine how much was so attributed. In Huss v Vande
Hey, 3 4 the jury verdict allowed $4,750, "for personal injuries." There
was no delineation of the component parts of the jury's figure. The
court stated that it was impossible to determine whether any or some
substantial part of the figure found by the jury represented an allow-
ance for future pain and suffering. The court, therefore, followed the
course outlined in Nelson v. Boulay Brothers Co., 3 5 where the court
said:
Since the verdict included in the answer to the damage ques-
tion an item which was legally erroneous, we conclude that there
must be a new trial on the question of damages. While this court
in Speals v. Milwaukee & S. T. Corp. (1963), 21 Wis. 2d 635,
... has extended the rule of Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1960)
10 Wis. 2d 78... to permit its use in cases in which the preju-
dicial error was confined to damages, we believe that in the instant
case the wiser course is to order a retrial of the damage issue.3
The court disposed of the appeal in Huss by granting a new trial
on all issues in the case because there was insufficient medical evidence
130 17 Wis. 2d 568, 117 N.W. 2d 660 (1962).
'31 Id. at 572, 117 N.W. 2d at 662.
132 Supra note 49.
1335 Wis. 2d 535, 93 N.W. 2d 433 (1958).
34 Supra note 105.
13527 Wis. 2d 637, 135 N.W. 2d 254 (1965).
1361 d. at 644, 135 N.W. 2d at 257.
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to support a verdict in which the jury may have included an allowance
for future pain and suffering. The court suggested that if the medical
proof offered in the new trial was no different from that presented in
the case at bar, the trial court should instruct the jury that no award
might be made for permanent injury or for future pain and suffering.
In Sawdey v. Schwenk," 7 the court held that in order to recover
for future medical expense there must be competent medical evidence
in the record; and, in Bleyer v. Gross,"8 the court held that competent
medical testimony is necessary to support a recovery for future medical
expense.139
RECOVERY OF MEDICAL EXPENSES By HUSBAND AND WIFE
In Jewell v. Schmidt, 40 the court held that the early rule was that
it was the husband's absolute duty to pay for medical services to his
wife and that this duty could not be altered even where the wife agreed
to pay the bills, recognized them as her personal debt and, in fact, made
payments on them from time to time from her separate estate. The
absolute bar, however, has been softened by subsequent decisions based
on statutes extending the legal rights of married women. The present
rule is that a married woman may contract for medical services in her
own right, but in the absence of the establishment of an express con-
tract between the wife and the person rendering the services, the
husband and not the wife is the person liable for such expenses and
the one entitled to recover for them.
In Seifert v. Milwaukee & S. T. Corp.,14' Dr. Hansher was the wife's
doctor before and during marriage. The doctor looked to the plaintiff
for his payment. In the emergency period following the plaintiff's in-
jury, Dr. Hansher engaged a plastic surgeon and an orthopedic spe-
cialist. There was no discussion at the time who would pay the spe-
cialist's bills. The trial court refused to permit the plaintiff to recover
for the specialist's bills, but the supreme court held that the trial court
erred in not allowing the bills.
In Fee v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 42 the court held that a husband's
marital obligation includes the duty to pay for medical care furnished
to his wife. When the husband has paid or incurred sums for the care
of his wife, he may recover them as damages from one who is legally
responsible for the injury which made them necessary, but the husband's
marital obligation is not an obligation to pay such sums as damages.
13 Supra note 67.13s19 Wis. 2d 305, 120 N.W. 2d 156 (1963).
139 To the same effect, see Crye v. Mueller, 7 Wis. 2d 182, 96 N.W. 2d 520 (1959)
and Borowske v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 20 Wis. 2d 93, 121 N.W. 2d 287
(1963).
1401 Wis. 2d 241, 83 N.W. 2d 487 (1957).
1414 Wis. 2d 623, 91 N.W. 2d 236 (1958).
142 17 Wis. 2d 364, 117 N.W. 2d 269 (1962).
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In Dwyer v. Jackson Co., 143 the court followed the decision in
Jewell v. Schmidt,144 and held that since there was no evidence of a con-
tract between the injured wife and the doctor who treated her, she
could not recover such medical expense in her action. The court dis-
tinguished Seifert v. Milwaukee & S. T. Corp.,145 upon the ground
that one doctor had been the wife's doctor before the accident and be-
fore her marriage and had always been paid by her. The other two
doctors were specialists called in by the first doctor immediately after
the accident when the plaintiff was in no condition to make a contract.
It was held that by later actions the wife ratified and approved her
doctor's act.
DAMAGES FOR PHYSICAL THERAPY TREATMENT
In Huss v. Vande Hey,14 6 the defendant contended that a plaintiff
could not recover the cost of physical therapy treatments which were
administered by a doctor's nurse in the absence of the doctor. Section
147.185(1) (b) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that a person may
not perform physiotherapy unless licensed by the Wisconsin State
Board of Medical Examiners, nor unless he practices under prescrip-
tion and the direct supervision of a person licensed to practice medicine
and surgery. The court held that recovery for the physiotherapy ex-
pense could be had. The court suggested that regardless of whether
the medical doctor was physically present or absent at the time the
physical therapy was rendered by a nurse in his office, the doctor was
fully responsible for her conduct under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Since it was undisputed that the services were performed by
a nurse at the direction of and as an aid to a licensed medical doctor,
the supreme court rejected the defendant's argument that the doctor's
charge for such services was unlawful.
TIME FOR COMPLETION OF MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS
The County Board of Judges of Milwaukee County have adopted
Rule 11, as amended December 31, 1963, entitled "Medical Examina-
tions," which reads as follows:
All medical examinations shall be completed no later than
10 days before the date for which the case has been set for
trial; except that, upon application, the court may permit such
examination to be made before the close of testimony at the
trial.
The rule is a salutary one and should be strictly enforced. The validity
of such a rule was inferentially upheld in Plesko v. Milwaukee.147 In
14320 Wis. 2d 318, 121 N.W. 2d 881 (1963).
14 Supra note 140.
145 Supra note 141.
146 Supra note 105.
147 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W. 2d 130 (1963).
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that case Dr. Montgomery's testimony concerning the plaintiff's report
of subjective symptoms on the day before trial was inadmissible "be-
cause of the report's proximity to trial." It is suggested that the com-
pletion dates for medical examinations might well be made by the court
at a pre-trial as provided by section 269.65 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
If the medical examinations are concluded in ample time before the
date set for trial and if the use of medical and hospital records have
been properly outlined at a pre-trial, the trial itself will be appreciably
expedited.
RECOVERY FOR TRAuMATIc NEUROSIS
The earliest case involving the recovery of damages resulting from
a traumatic neurosis was Heindel v. Wisconsin T., L. H., & P. Co.,148
decided by the supreme court in April, 1919. The evidence in that case
disclosed that the plaintiff, a young girl 21 years of age, had been in-
jured in a collision between two automobiles. The plaintiff claimed that
by reason of the shock and fright suffered in the collision, she had
sustained a traumatic neurosis which, according to medical testimony,
was permanent. Without any discussion, the court sustained a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff.
In Landrath v. Allstate Ins. Co.,14 9 decided in 1951, Mrs. Landrath
brought an action as a guest to recover damages resulting from a col-
lision of two automobiles. The only objective evidence of injury con-
sisted in a small scar on the plaintiff's chin which one of the doctors
described as a little bump. There was medical evidence which established
that Mrs. Landrath suffered from a traumatic neurosis due to the in-
jury. One of the doctors testified that traumatic neurosis is a condition
which often exists when someone is making a claim against another
arising out of an accident. In some cases where this condition exists
after the person suffering from the ailment obtains a settlement or the
case is disposed of, the condition disappears. There was medical testi-
mony, however, that the plaintiff was not malingering. The court per-
mitted recovery by the plaintiff but found the damages awarded by
the jury excessive and gave to the defendant the option to have judg-
ment entered for a fixed amount, and in the event the defendant refused
to permit the entry of judgment, a new trial would be awarded.
In Sundquist v. M1ladison Rys. Co.,150 the plaintiff was sitting in the
rear seat of an automobile waiting in a line of cars for a traffic signal
to change when the automobile in which she was a passenger was struck
from the rear by a streetcar operated by the defendant railway com-
pany. The plaintiff saw the streetcar approaching and became hysterical
when the crash came. She sustained no injuries. Approximately eight
148 169 Wis. 181, 171 N.W. 938 (1919).
149 259 Wis. 248, 48 N.W. 2d 485 (1951).
150 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
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days after the accident, while the automobile in which the plaintiff
was a passenger was standing near the curb and out of the path of a
streetcar at Olympia, Washington, a streetcar approached the car and
clanged its bell. The plaintiff immediately became hysterical, later
fainted and during the following night one side of her body became
paralyzed. Although there was the usual disagreement among the doc-
tors, there was credible medical evidence to sustain a finding that the
paralysis of the plaintiff followed naturally and directly from the shock
which she sustained when the automobile in which she was riding was
struck by the defendant's streetcar. The trial court entered judgment
for the plaintiff and, upon appeal, the judgment was sustained.
The court, in Sundquist,'5 ' made the following statement: "It is
not essential to liability that there be proof of any bodily physical
injury in case physical disability results naturally and directly from
extreme fright or shock.' 52
In Waube v. Warrington,153 Susie Waube witnessed a collision be-
tween an automobile operated by the defendant, Amber Rose Warring-
ton, and Dolores Waube, the infant daughter of Susie Waube. As a result
of the collision, Dolores Waube was killed. As a result of the accident,
Susie Waube became hysterical through fright, shock and extensive
sudden emotional disturbances, and in approximately two weeks after
the episode, Susie Waube died. The question presented was whether
the mother of a child who, although not put in peril or fear of
physical impact, sustains the shock of witnessing the negligent killing
of her child, may recover for physical injuries caused by such fright or
shock. The court, after a detailed analysis of the authorities, concluded
that the mother could not recover.
In Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co.," 4 the question arose whether
Mrs. Klassa or Mrs. Lepianka sustained any injuries for which re-
covery of damages were sought solely upon the basis of the result of
shock and fright caused by the apprehension for the safety of the two
Klassa sons who were in the basement of the plaintiff's home at the
time an explosion occurred. The shock and fright did not take place
at the time of the explosion, but later, when both women were out of
the house. They at this time discovered that the Klassa sons were in
the basement. The court held that the decision in the Waube case was
grounded on sound consideration of public policy and should be ad-
hered to.
In Colla v. Mandella,"5' Mandella negligently parked a truck which
rolled down a hill and crashed into Colla's house near the place where
151 Ibid.
215 197 Wis. at 86, 221 N.W. at 393.
"53216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
54 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W. 2d 397 (1956).
155 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W. 2d 345 (1957).
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he was sleeping. The crash made a loud noise which frightened Colla.
Colla was 63 years old at the time and was suffering from high blood
pressure and a mild heart condition, for which he was being treated by
a doctor, but which was not disabling. At the time of the accident, he
was taking a nap in the bedroom. Two or three minutes after the crash,
Colla came out of the house, appeared frightened, was white and shak-
ing and holding his hand over his heart and talking with a trembling
voice. The evening following the accident Colla could not breathe and
the next day the doctor found his heart condition to be worse. Colla
died of heart failure ten days after the accident. The attending physician
testified that the excitement from the accident was a sufficient cause
to throw Colla into heart failure and that the accident precipitated the
heart failure and caused attendant pain and suffering although the heart
failure could have resulted without a scare. There was no evidence that
the noise or shock of the accident would have been likely to cause any
harm to a person in normal good health. The court held that there could
be recovery on account of Colla's death, upon the authority of Sunquist
v. Madison Rys. Co., 1 56 Pankopf v. Hinkley,157 and Waube v War-
rington.'58
In Johnson v. Industrial Comm.,'59 the court held that traumatic
neurosis or hysteria caused by an industrial accident was a compensable
injury.
In Gallagher v. Industrial Comm., 160 it was contended that the
award of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission could be sustained upon
the evidence relating to conversion hysteria. One of the doctors who
testified did not use the general term, traumatic neurosis, but the specific
term, conversion hysteria. The court cited a number of decisions, from
other jurisdictions, holding that conversion hysteria, also known as
conversion reaction, has been held to be compensable. The court cited I
LARSON ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, 619, section 42.24, (1952).
where the author states that compensation neurosis must be distin-
guished from conscious malingering. The court said that assuming, but
not deciding compensation neurosis was compensable, there was a prac-
tical problem in compensating for conversion hysteria or conversion re-
action. Upon the medical testimony contained in the record, the ap-
pellant's mental illness was temporary in its nature. One of the doctors
testified that the conversion hysteria would end one year after the
payment.
It was contended in Gallagher,61 that the Johnson'6 " case was con-
156 Supra note 150.
157 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909).
158 Supra note 153.
159 Supra note 70.
160 9 Wis. 2d 361, 101 N.W. 2d 72 (1960).
161 Ibid.
162 Supra note 70.
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trolling. The court distinguished Johnson upon the ground that it did
not involve compensation neurosis or conversion hysteria. The trau-
matic neurosis there involved was of such a nature and the medical
testimony was to the effect that the neurosis could be cured by psychi-
atric treatments. In the Gallagher case there was no medical testimony
that the type of neurosis claimed by the applicant could be cured by
any psychiatric therapy.
McMahon v. Bergeson638 has been characterized by a later decision
of the supreme court as presenting "rather bizzare facts."' 164 In Mc-
Mahon, the defendant, Bergeson, drove through a red light and struck
the side of the plaintiff's car. Before the plaintiff's car came to rest,
he fell or was thrown from his car and landed on his feet. One of the
doctors testified that as a result of the collision the plaintiff, McMahon,
sustained a traumatic neurosis; an anxiety reaction precipitated by a
trauma. The neurosis was triggered by the sight of Mr. and Mrs.
Bergeson at the scene of the accident who, at the time, reminded Mc-
Mahon of his own father and mother. McMahon identified Bergeson
with his father against whom he had a hatred complex. The court
arrived at the following conclusion:
The testimony of Dr. Smith establishes that the neurosis did
not have its origin in the brain concussion, but was due to the
plaintiff's having seen Bergeson immediately after the accident
lying on the pavement with his wife standing alongside. This re-
quires that the same rule of damages be applied as in the cases in
which recovery is allowed for emotional distress alone. Such
rule precludes recovery in an action grounded upon negligence
for emotional distress which is due to a pre-existing susceptibility
to emotional disturbance not present in a normal individual, un-
less the actor had prior knowledge of such susceptibility. 65
There was a dissenting opinion by Justice Fairchild. The opinion
recites that the unusual elements involved in the case, including the
plaintiff's emotional background and the resemblance of the Bergesons
to his parents, did not constitute public policy grounds for denial of
recovery. Colla v. Mandellal" was cited for the proposition that far
more serious physical injury to the plaintiff would not be an extra-
ordinary result of an identical accident.
In Riehl v. De Quaine 67 the physical injuries sustained by Mrs.
Riehl in an automobile accident were moderate in nature and cleared
up in a relatively short time. She contended, however, that she suffered
from an incapacitating compensation neurosis, a type which was per-
manent in nature and was caused by the accident. The court reviewed
163 9 Wis. 2d 256, 101 N.W. 2d 63 (1960).
164 See Riehl v. De Quaine, stepra note 22.
165 9 Wis. 2d at 272, 101 N.W. 2d at 71.
166 Supra note 155.
167 Supra note 22.
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some of the previous cases involving traumatic neurosis and stated
the court was confident that a great majority of the bench and bar
rightly assumed that damages for traumatic neurosis, when associated
with physical injury, were recoverable in personal injury actions in
Wisconsin. MicMahon v. Bergeson16 8 was cited to the point that it was
there clearly implied that such was the law. The point in that case,
upon which the majority and minority divided, was whether the impact
of the accident had triggered the plaintiff's neurosis. The majority held
that the impact did not but that the defendant driver's tortious con-
duct had placed the plaintiff in a position where a subsequent event
did trigger it and because of this factor, there could be no recovery
for the neurosis which would not have been produced in a normal
individual absent a showing that the defendant driver knew of such
susceptibility. The court referred to at least one instance where it had
been mistakenly assumed that the majority opinion in M~cMahon would
permit no recovery for traumatic neurosis in automobile negligence
cases if the plaintiff was more susceptible to a neurosis than the normal
individual. The court disavowed such a conclusion. It characterized the
McMahon holding as not to be extended beyond "the peculiar and rather
bizzare facts there presented." 1609
There was conflicting medical testimony in MilcMahon with respect
to the question of whether the plaintiff had a traumatic neurosis. The
award of damages made by the jury indicated that the plaintiff's neuro-
sis was not caused by the accident. The court held such awards not in-
adequate if the element of neurosis was eliminated.
RECOVERY IN CANCER CASE
Seymour v. Industrial Comm. 70 was a case where the Wisconsin
Industrial Commission awarded compensation for aggravation of a
chordoma at L 4. The applicant fell on his buttocks twice within the
period of a week. Six months later a laminectomy was performed, but no
herniated disc was discovered. Nine months after the operation a sec-
ond laminectomy was performed on L4 and a chordoma was found
which was partially removed. Seven months after the second operation,
there was a third operation which showed the tumor had advanced ap-
preciably. Three doctors, including a doctor who performed the second
and third operations, testified that the two falls aggravated the tumor.
Dr. Enzer, a pathologist at Mt. Sinai Hospital in Milwaukee since 1927,
testified that the falls had nothing to do with the disability of the appli-
cant which due to a malignant tumor of the spinal cord; that there was
no basis for relating a single trauma to the cause, development or be-
168 Supra note 163.
169 24 Wis. 2d at 30, 127 N.W. 2d at 792.
17025 Wis. 2d 482, 131 N.W. 2d 323 (1964).
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havior of a malignant tumor; that the statistics of the two World Wars
disproved that trauma causes or aggravates cancer; and that motor ve-
hicle accident statistics are to the same effect. He also testified that there
was no evidence that the trauma or surgery had initiated a development
or aggravation of a tumor; that in order for a trauma to be effective
to aggravate a tumor it should be proven to have applied itself to the tis-
sue exactly where the tumor arose. The Commission, as a finding of
fact, found:
*.. that although his tumor pre-existed his injury of March
9 and March 16, it was asymptomatic and was not disabling; that
the injury of such dates provoked a reaction and stimulated the
development of the tumor, which had been quiescent; ... I"
The court cited Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co.,' 7 2 where
recovery was denied for injuries which were alleged to have produced a
mongoloid infant. In Seymour,'7" the trial judge felt the testimony was
speculative and conjectural but stated that he could not substitute his
opinion for that of the medical experts. The supreme court felt the
same way, but it too believed that it could not disturb the findings of
the Industrial Commission. The cross-examination of the applicant's
experts disclosed that his opinion "gets down to a sequence of events,"
that "trauma aggravated the tumor and facilitated its extension," mean-
ing that the trauma permitted the tumor's extension beyond the site of
confinement by providing routes and avenues which, prior to the occur-
rence of the trauma, "were not to its avail," that the avenues of exten-
sion were provided "when the trauma caused an inflammatory reac-
tion in the tissues adjacent to and extending into the tumor," and that
the presence of scar tissue formation in the microscope slides confirmed
that the "inflammatory reaction had occurred." One of the doctors based
his opinion to a reasonable medical certaintly that the trauma aggravated
a pre-existing chordoma by causing disruption of the tissues and by cre-
ating spaces and avenues of extension so that the chordoma would
spread, but "that there was no clinical evidence of the trauma having
provided avenues of extension except the chronological sequence of
events."1
74
In reality, the court in Seymour relied upon 1 LARSON, LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, page 192.39, section 12.20, where the author
states that aggravating a disease is exemplified by cancer cases in which
the malignant growth is ruptured or spread by occupational exertions or
in which its development is hastened by strains, impacts, or accidents in
the course of employment.
'71 Id. at 485, 131 N.W. 2d at 324.
172 Supra note 72.
7 3Supra note 170.
17425 Wis. 2d at 488, 489, 131 N.W. 2d at 326.
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The Seymour case might be contrasted with Kablitz v. Hoeft.175 In
this case the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. In 1935, he
had osteomyelitis from a gun-shot wound. He was hospitalized and
worked only part-time from 1936 to 1940. In 1940 there was a recur-
rence of the osteomyelitis and again, hospitalization. In 1946 or 1947
there was again a recurrence of the osteomyelitis, but no hospitalization.
Two or three days after the accident of October 18, 1961, the osteomye-
litis again recurred. There was medical evidence that the 1961 flare-up
was caused by the trauma of the accident. The court was influenced by
the fact that for fourteen years there was no flare-up, while there was a
flare-up shortly after the accident.
There was an interesting procedural point presented in the Kablitz76
case which involved the calling of the defendant's doctor adversely by
the plaintiff. At the request of the defendant's counsel, Dr. Alfred Krit-
ter, an orthopedic surgeon, examined Kablitz, sent his report to the
attorneys and was paid by Farmers Mutual. The trial court considered
him to be an agent of Farmers Mutual under section 325.14 and per-
mitted the plaintiff to call him adversely. The supreme court held that
the trial court committed error; that Dr. Kritter was an independent
contractor and not an agent of the insurance company. The plaintiff
contended that unless he was able to call Dr. Kritter adversely, under
section 325.14, the only way he would be able to learn the results of the
examination would be to call the doctor on direct and take the chances
that go with making him his own witness. The court replied to the
plaintiff's contention as follows:
Respondent overlooks the fact that a discovery examination
may be conducted of the doctor (even though not an agent) prior
to trial under sec. 326.12, and that the defendant may be com-
pelled to supply the plaintiff with a copy of the doctor's report
under the provisions of sec. 269.57.177
REcOvERY FOR EMOTIONAL HARM
Alsteen v. Gehl 17s was a case in which Mrs. Alsteen attempted to
recover from a contractor damages resulting from emotional distress
caused by misconduct of the contractor in the performance of a con-
tract to re-side the plaintiff's house. The court said it had held that a
person might be required to compensate another for emotional distress
which attended physical harm intentionally or negligently inflicted upon
the injured party and that it had also permitted recovery for severe emo-
tional harm if the psychological disturbance was a response to an inten-
tional invasion of an independent legally protected interest. The court
175 25 Wis. 2d 518, 131 N.W. 2d 346 (1964).
178 Ibid.
17 25 Wis. 2d at 522,131 N.W. 2d at 348, 349.
17821 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W. 2d 312 (1963).
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gave, as an example, a person who had been libeled might recover dam-
ages for the emotional distress attending destruction of a good reputa-
tion. The court extended the rule in the following language:
We now conclude that a person may recover damages for
severe emotional stress alone, if such psychological condition is
the result of the extreme and outrageous conduct of another and
if such course of conduct was undertaken by the defendant for
the purpose of inflicting psychological harm upon the injured
person.'79
USE OF A SIGNED STATEMENT FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES
In Musha v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 80 the court held
that the offered statement was admissible. The opinion, however, in dis-
tinguishing some cases cited against the admissibility of the statement,
recited:
These cases are distinguishable. In all of them the witness de-
nied the truthfulness of the statement which was being used for
impeachment. When the witness unequivocally denies that the
statement accurately represents what he said, such signed state-
ment is inadmissible for impeachment until the person who tran-
scribed or took down the statement or some other person having
knowledge of the facts is sworn as a witness and testifies that the
statement was a true acount of what the declarant said. For the
purpose of impeachment, such procedure is necessary in order to
lay a proper foundation for the admission of such disputed state-
ment.18 '
In Jensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co.,' 8 2 the court, after referring to
the foregoing citation, said:
While the weight of authority may support this statement,
further consideration of the problem has caused us to doubt its
soundness. Some authorities hold that, if the party signing the
statement, which is offered as an admission, or for impeachment
purposes, admits that the signature subscribed thereto is his,
such signature should be sufficient authentication for admitting
the statement . . . It would seem both reasonable and logical
that, if during the cross-examination of a witness he is shown a
conflicting statement that purports to bear his signature and he
admits it is his signature, this should be sufficient authentication
to justify its admission into evidence. It would then be open to
the witness to offer any explanation he may have as to why he
should not be bound by the statement, such as not having read it
when he signed it, or that the party transcribing it had incorrectly
recorded what the witness had said.
8 3
179 Id. at 356, 357, 124 N.W. 2d at 316.
180 10 Wis. 2d 176, 102 N.W. 2d 243 (1960).
181 Id. at 182, 102 N.W. 2d at 247.
1s 23 Wis. 2d 344, 127 N.W. 2d 228 (1964).
1s3 Id. at 351, 352, 127 N.W. 2d at 232.
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In Mack v. Decker,8 4 during cross-examination, Patricia Mack was
shown a written statement purporting to give her version of the acci-
dent. The statement consisted of one page and a portion of a second
page, both of which were subscribed, "Patricia Mack." Miss Mack was
asked if the signatures were hers and she admitted that they were. An
attempt was then made to read a portion of the written statement, but
the trial court sustained an objection to the appellant's counsel reading
from the statement in questioning the witness. At the conclusion of the
cross-examination, appellants' counsel offered the statement in evidence,
but the trial court excluded it. It appeared that at the time Miss Mack
signed the statement, she was confined in a hospital where she was given
sedatives for pain. The excluded statement contradicted Miss Mack's
testimony given at the trial. The supreme court held that the admissi-
bility of the statement was governed by Jensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins.
Co.," 5 and that the two signatures on the statement which, according to
Miss Mack, were her signatures, constituted sufficient authentication to
entitle the statement to be admitted. Miss Mack's testimony that she
could not recall giving or reading the statement and the conflicting evi-
dence whether she was under sedatives at the time she signed it went to
the weight to be accorded the statement, not its admissibility. It was
significant to note that the hospital records disclosed the administration
of sedatives before 8:15 A.M. and that at 11:00 A.M., the nurse had
noted that Mis Mack was writing letters and at 2:00 P.M., she was
visiting. At 3:00 P.M. the notation in the hospital record was, "com-
fortable day." The statements were signed in the afternoon.
MISCELLANEOUS
There must be competent medical evidence to sustain a wage loss ;'
but the jury can determine for itself, whether a scar is disfiguring. 1 7
An opinion given in response to a hypothetical question has proba-
tive value only when it is based upon premises satisfactorily proved in
the record.1 18 A hypothetical question need only state the facts required
to allow the expert to provide a correct answer on the theory advocated
by the questioner's side of the case.'8 "
A plaintiff can testify to his pain and suffering up to the date of the
trial.190
18424 Wis. 2d 219, 128 N.W. 2d 455 (1964).
185 Supra note 182.
186 Mixis v. Wisconsin Public Service Co.. 26 Wis. 2d 488, 132 N.W. 2d 769
(1965) and Bradford v. Milwaukee & S. T. Co., 25 Wis. 2d 161, 130 N.W.
2d 282 (1964).
187 Sennott v. Seeber, 6 Wis. 2d 590, 95 N.W. 2d 269 (1959).
188 Mass. B. & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 8 Wis. 2d 606, 99 N.W. 2d 809
(1959); Franckowiak v. Industrial Comm., 12 Wis. 2d 85, 106 N.W. 2d 51(1960); Theisen v. Industrial Comm., 8 Wis. 2d 144, 98 N.W. 2d 446 (1959).
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MEDICAL EVIDENCE
The jury has the right to disbelieve the uncontradicted testimony of
a witness if it is against reasonable probabilities.' 91
Trial practice is considered in Gauthier v. State.'9 2 In that case,
which was a criminal case, the complainant was permitted to testify
from notes which she had prepared almost three years after the alleged
offenses took place and about three months before the trial. She testified
that she wrote the notes after the District Attorney asked her to write
down what she remembered and what she could recall three years after
the incident occurred. The testimony revealed the witness' own recollec-
tion which was the basis of the notes and which was refreshed by them.
The court, upon the authority of 3 WIGMoRa, EVIDENCE, (3d ed.), page
10, section 761 and other authorities, concluded that it was perfectly
proper for the complainant to testify from the notes that she had pre-
pared. The court cited Smith v. State,'93 where the court said:
After two years time it was natural for anyone when they
know they are going to be put on the witness stand to sit down
and think about the matter and jot down notes before they got
on the witness stand so that they could refresh their recollection
from them. 9 4
In many instances, particularly those involving treatment by doctors
and time spent in the hospital, the taking of the testimony could be ex-
pedited without any danger of fabrication and without infringing upon
the right of cross-examination.
CONCLUSION
The population explosion, the progress made in the arts and sci-
ences, particularly in relation to atomic energy and outer space, has af-
forded us a glimpse of the problems which will arise in personal injury
litigation in the next decade. Despite the progress which has been made
the major problem remains the same. The statement of Heraclitus of
Ephesus, quoted by Joseph W. Planck, in 'Producing Great Lawyers:
Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy," 44 American Bar Association
Journal, 327, 328, is as true today as it was 2,500 years ago:
The major problem of human society is to combine that de-
gree of liberty without which law is tyranny with that degree of
law without which liberty becomes license.
6 Wis. 2d 590, 95 N.W. 2d 269 (1959) ; Kincannon v. National Indemnity Co.,
5 Wis. 2d 231,92 N.W. 2d 884 (1958).
191 Foellmi v. Smith, 15 Wis. 2d 274, 112 N.W. 2d 712 (1961); Pagel v. Holewinski,
11 Wis. 2d 634, 106 N.W. 2d 425 (1960); Lubner v. Peerless Ins. Co., 19
Wis. 2d 364, 120 N.W. 2d 54 (1963); Kuzel v. State Farm Mut. Automobile
Ins. Co., 20 Wis. 2d 558, 123 N.W. 2d 470 (1963).
19228 Wis. 2d 412, 137 N.W. 2d 101 (1965).
193 205 Tenn. 502, 327 S.W. 2d 308 (1959).
194 Id. at 540, 327 S.W. 2d at 325.
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Perhaps Mr. Justice Cardozo, has provided an answer when he said
in "Growth of the Law," page 20:
The inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end.
The law, like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow. It must
have the principle of growth.
It is hoped that this article may assist in the solution of some of the
problems which lie ahead.
